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Robert Dostal 
Bryn Mawr College 
 
Gadamer, Kant, and the Enlightenment 
 






 Gadamer is prominent on the list of counter-enlightenment 
philosophers of the 20th century.  He is on this list for good reasons and 
reasons that I will here briefly explore.  Gadamer borrows much from 
Heidegger’s critique of modernity and he adds to it.  As we all know, 
Gadamer’s critique of the Enlightenment and modernity serves as an 
opening for a reappropriation of the Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle.  
Gadamer is often taken to be, again for good reason, one of the leading 
voices revivifying the battle of ancients and moderns and urging, at least in 
some regards, the superiority of the ancients.   Kant is without question the 
leading figure of the Enlightenment—at least within the German tradition, if 
not for the European Enlightenment in general.  As such we should expect 
Gadamer to be strongly critical of Kant.  And yet we find Gadamer’s 
relation to Kant displaying a deep ambivalence.   It is this ambivalence that 
this paper examines. 
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 In the Library of Living Philosophers volume dedicated to Gadamer 
David Detmer contributed an essay simply titled:  “Gadamer’s Critique of 
the Enlightenment.”  Detmer writes of Gadamer’s “radical anti-
Enlightenment views.”1  Gadamer responds by writing: 
 It is extremely astonishing to me that my project of a philosophical  
hermeneutics …[is] being discussed under the title ‘critique of Enlightenment’ ….   
What Kant calls enlightenment in truth corresponds to what hermeneutics has in 
view.2 
 
In the same volume, in response to Francis Ambrosio’s essay, “The Figure 
of Socrates in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” in which Ambrosio 
argues that the central figure in all Gadamer’s work is Socrates, Gadamer 
writes in response:  “By and large I want to regard this as a correct 
appropriation. … But I am missing the name of Kant here.”3  Ambrosio had 
mentioned the significance of Hegel and Heidegger for Gadamer.  He had 
not mentioned Kant. 
 So why and how is Kant so important for Gadamer?  Kant’s essay on 
enlightenment, “Was heißt Aufklärung?,” stands out as a culminating 
expression of what the Enlightenment is about.   This is so not only for 
                                                        
1 David Detmer, “Gadamer’s Critique of the Enlightenment,” in Lewis Hahn, ed., The 
Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. XXIV 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 275 
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Reply to David Detmer,” The Philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, 287. 
3 Ibid., “Reply to Francis Ambrosio,” 274. 
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Gadamer but for most every writer and commentator on the 
Enlightenment—Foucault, for example. At the center of Kant’s articulation 
of the Enlightenment is the Latin motto, borrowed from Horace, “Sapere 
aude!”—dare to think for yourself.  In the “Afterword” to Truth and 
Method  Gadamer refers to the “abstract” character of this motto and its 
“blindness.”4  The motto’s blindness is a blindness concerning human 
finitude and the historical, traditional ineluctable context for any human 
endeavor including thinking.  The context for the remark is Gadamer’s 
defense of his rehabilitation of authority in the face of the criticisms of 
Habermas and others.  Yet in a later essay, “Science as an Instrument of 
Enlightenment” Gadamer approvingly appropriates the motto for himself 
and prescribes it to us to rescue us from our immaturity—an immaturity that 
is leading us to self-destruction.5  What we need is “reflection” and 
“judgment” and what these require is “the courage to think”—Sapere aude!   
 In trying to come to terms with Gadamer’s relationship to the 
Enlightenment and modernity it is important to recognize that for Gadamer it 
                                                        
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd edition, translation revised by Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York:  Continuum, 1999), p. 571;  for the 
German, see Gesammelte Werke, Bd 2: Hermeneutik II (Tübingen:  Mohr Siebeck, 
1993), 470.  Further references to Gadamer’s Collected Works in German:  GW; 
further references to Truth and Method: TM. 
5Gadamer, “Science as an Instrument of the Enlightenment,” Praise of Theory, 
translation by Chris Dawson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 71-83; 
for the German: “Wissenschaft als Instrument der Aufklärung,” Lob der Theorie 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1983). 
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is a mistaken oversimplification to talk about the Enlightenment as though it 
is a single phenomenon (though he sometimes does just this, especially in 
Truth and Method). 
 
II.  The ‘Bad’ Enlightenment and Kant 
Most importantly, Gadamer distinguishes between the “enlightenment 
of early modernity” and the larger enlightenment project. In a review essay 
on two books by Jürgen Mittelstraß that concerned themselves with 
modernity, Gadamer approves of Mittelstraß’es labeling early modernity as 
the “bad” Enlightenment—die schlechten Aufklärung.6  Elsewhere Gadamer 
refers to the “radical Enlightenment” and to the ideal of a “complete” 
Enlightenment.7  I take it that these three titles—the “bad” Enlightenment, 
the “radical” Enlightenment, and the “complete” Enlightenment—are titles 
for the same thing.  The “complete” Enlightenment is what the “bad” or 
“radical” Enlightenment hopes for.  Gadamer calls this the “idol” of 
modernity.   Each and every reference to any of these three comes with a 
sharp criticism. 
But Gadamer considers this ‘bad’ Enlightenment to be a mere 
‘interruption’ of the development of modern thought and culture—an 
                                                        
6 Gadamer, “Neuzeit und Aufklärung,” GW 4, 64. 
7 “Reply to David Detmer,” The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 287. 
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interruption that is relatively brief.  The legacy of this bad Enlightenment 
remains for us a tendency in contemporary Western culture but it is only 
that—a tendency, one among others.  It finds its 20th century philosophical 
expression in logical positivism and utilitarianism and their sometimes 
union.  This ‘interruption’ was inaugurated by Descartes and ended with 
Rousseau and Kant.  Gadamer writes:  “Since Rousseau and Kant this idol of 
the Enlightenment is over.”8  Measured this way the interruption was a mere 
115 years (1637 till 1754 when Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality was 
published).     
 Gadamer does not, however, distinguish between the good 
Enlightenment and the bad Enlightenment in Truth and Method.  Almost 
every reference to the Enlightenment in this work is negative and, in light of 
the distinction that he makes elsewhere, pertains to the ‘bad’ Enlightenment. 
   Before we turn to how Kant helped end this ‘interruption,’ let us look 
quickly at the features of the Enlightenment of early modernity about which 
Gadamer is so critical.  Fundamental to the theoretical and scientific project 
of early modernity are a representational epistemology.  In short, what is 
first for us is the ideas or representations that we have in our mind.  The 
epistemological question is whether they accurately portray what is external 
                                                        
8 Gadamer, “Rationalität im Wandel der Zeiten,” GW 4, 36. 
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to consciousness, to mind.  We are left with a quandary however, since all 
we have is our own ideas and there is no way to “get out of our heads”-- to 
compare the real world with our ideas to see whether they truly correspond.  
This representational epistemology with its Cartesian paradigm is basic to 
both the Continental rationalists and the British empiricists.  Locke, for 
example, asks the following question:  “How shall the mind, when it 
perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things 
themselves?”9 This epistemological quandary leads to Hume’s skepticism.    
This, of course, is the problem that Gadamer is referring to in the chapter 
title of Truth and Method:  “Overcoming the Epistemological Problem 
through Phenomenological Research.” (Part II. I. 3.) 
 Hand in hand with this epistemological problem comes subjectivism.  
The Cartesian starting point is the mind, the subject.  The question or 
problem concerns the mind’s or subject’s grasp (greifen, begreifen) of the 
object.   Language is considered an instrumental sign by which we 
communicate to others whatever grasp we have (the subject has) of the 
objects of experience.   To insure the objectivity of the subject’s grasp of the 
object, the subject must follow the scientific method which requires a 
rejection of previous assumptions, of traditional ways of taking the object, of 
                                                        
9 Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter iv, no. 3. 
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any pre-judgment or prejudice about the matter at hand.  We are to start with 
a clean slate.  The method insures success.   Modern science is the arbiter of 
truth.  Subjectivism, scientism, and ‘methodologism’ come hand in hand. 
 On the practical side, the side of ethics and politics (the side that is 
paramount for Gadamer), the early Enlightenment is marked by the attempt 
to establish an ethics and politics on the basis of well-founded rules and 
laws.  The ancient and medieval tradition of a virtue ethic in which prudence 
(phronesis) is paramount is rejected.  Prudence is demoted to a kind of 
cautionary principle, a careful avoidance of risk.  Ethical decisions are not 
be the function of judgment but an ethical calculus, a derivation from a rule.  
The modern approach, as best seen in Hobbes and Locke, is a kind of 
atomistic individualism that ethically culminates in the development of 
utilitarianism.  It pays little attention to friendship and solidarity.  It rejects 
authority and belittles rhetoric.  It enthusiastically understands its project as 
establishing a republic of reason and sees evidence of the progress of 
humanity as it embraces modern science, democracy, and human rights.  A 
number of basic dichotomies underlie this Enlightenment project:  
subjectivity and objectivity, ought and is, feeling and reason, authority and 
reason, rhetoric and reason.  This list can be extended:  body/mind, 
female/male, compulsion/freedom and so on.  
 8 
  According to the claim of Gadamer cited above, Kant, together with 
Rousseau, put an end to this bad Enlightenment.  The obvious and large 
difficulty with this claim is that almost all the characteristics of the bad 
Enlightenment—all the dichotomies and dualisms--of which Gadamer is so 
critical are carried forward and often intensified in the work of Kant.  Kant 
brings epistemological representationalism to its culmination.  Anything 
intellectual is a representation (eine Vorstellung) for Kant.  Intuitions and 
concepts, the stuff of consciousness are representations.  Of course, as is 
well known, Kant found a way out of the dilemma of modern epistemology 
by abandoning any claim of knowledge of the things as they are in 
themselves.  We know only appearances, that is, things as they are 
represented by us.  Appearances are representations. This way out, Kant’s 
Copernican turn in philosophy, is led by the question as to what are the 
conditions of the possibility of experience.  But experience for Kant 
ultimately means science—and the natural sciences.  It is not an accident 
that 19th century turn away from Hegel and back to Kant was motivated 
largely by a concern for an adequate account of science.  Neo-Kantianism is 
often, especially in its positivisitic mode, a scientism. Gadamer recognized 
Kant’s legacy in the scientism of the 19th and 20th centuries.  For example, in 
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the late essay “Humanismus und industrielle Revolution,” Gadamer writes 
how under Kant’s authority the lifeworld was ignored on behalf of science.10   
This theoretical ignorance is directly related to the practical side of 
the ‘bad’ Enlightenment.  At the heart of the Enlightenment project is the 
pushing aside of prudence on behalf of appropriately grounded ethical rules.  
One can see this most clearly and simply in Hobbes when he writes that “as 
much experience is prudence; so, is much science, sapience. …both useful, 
but the latter infallible.”11  Hobbes would replace prudence with or 
subordinate it to an ethical-political science.  Kant follows him on this.   
 Kant’s German for prudence (prudentia) is Klugheit.   Klugheit for 
Kant is not moral.  It is a matter of skill and is merely “pragmatic”: 
 The practical law from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic (rule of  
prudence [Klugheit];  but that which is such that it has no other motive than  
the worthiness to be happy I call moral (moral law).12   
 
This is to say that prudence, so called, is a function of the hypothetical  
 
imperative and not the categorical imperative.   
 
 Now, skill in the choice of means to one’s own greatest well-being can 
be called prudence [Klugheit] in the narrowest sense. …  the precept of  
prudence [Klugheit], is still always hypothetical ….13  
 
                                                        
10 Gadamer, Hermeneutische Entwürfe (Tübingen:  Mohr Siebeck, 2000), p. 31. 
11 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter V, Para #21. 
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translation by Paul Guyer and Allen 
Wood (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1997),  A806/B834. 
13 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translation by Mary 
Gregor in Practical Philosophy (New York:   Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
68-69;  for the German, see the Akademie edition IV, 416. 
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In short, prudence is the ability to determine how best to accomplish one’s 
goals, whether they are moral or not.  ‘Best’ here may be taken to mean 
‘most effectively’ or ‘efficiently.’  As such it is not a moral virtue.  From an 
Aristotelian (and Gadamerian) perspective, the moderns, including Kant, 
have turned phronesis into deinotes, that is, cleverness.   
 Kant’s approach to ethics is rule-governed and principle-based.  
However much the contemporary advocates of Kantian ethics want to show 
us the importance of the virtues for a Kantian ethic, it is undeniable that 
virtue is subordinate to principle and rule.  And Gadamer is an advocate of 
virtue ethics and is critical of modern rule-based ethics.  
 Kant also is one with the Enlightenment rejection of tradition and 
authority as antithetical to reason. Similarly, Kant in his political writings 
embraces much of Hobbes’ view of the human endeavor.  Additionally he 
accepts Mandeville’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’ at work through the 
greediness and cleverness of competing individuals.  Kant too sees progress 
of a sort in human history.  He is ambivalent about this because the progress 
he sees—in science, in politics and economics--is not moral progress, the 
only kind of progress that really counts. 
We could extend this list of the many ways that Kant is an exemplar 
of what Gadamer counts as the ‘bad’ or ‘radical’ Enlightenment much 
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further.  But let us round out this list with the brief mention of two other 
items:  1) rhetoric, and 2) the subjectivization of aesthetics.  Among other 
things, Gadamer attempts to revive the rhetorical tradition.  This goes hand 
in hand with his rehabilitation of authority and tradition.  They are closely 
related.  And the Enlightenment, simply put, rejects rhetoric.  Hobbes attacks 
rhetoric as the “abuse of speech.”14  Locke follows Hobbes, calling 
“figurative speech” an “abuse of language” and rhetoric “perfect cheat.”15  
Kant agrees, writing that rhetoric “is not worthy of any respect at all.”16 For 
Kant, like Locke, the art of persuasion is the art of “deceiving by means of 
beautiful illusion.”17  It moves men “like machines,” Kant writes.18  In short, 
it violates human freedom and is in opposition to reason.  Gadamer finds the 
Enlightenment and Kantian antithesis of tradition and reason, of authority 
and reason, and of rhetoric and reason to be false.  Gadamer acknowledges 
that, of course, “rhetoric appeals to feelings,” but “that in no way means it 
falls outside the realm of the reasonable.”19  That is, the antithesis of reason 
and feeling is another false antithesis.  In defense of his attempt to 
                                                        
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter IV, #14. 
15 Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, Book III, chapter X, #34. 
16 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, translation by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 205; German Academy edition V, 
328. 
17 Ibid., 204; 327. 
18 Ibid., 205; 328. 
19 TM 568; GW 2, 467. 
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rehabilitate rhetoric and against his critics, Gadamer writes:  “I find it 
frightenly unreal when people like Habermas ascribe to rhetoric a 
compulsory quality that one must reject in favor of unconstrained rational 
dialogue.”20  
And, finally, Gadamer is critical of Kant for his legacy in aesthetics, a 
legacy of the subjectivization of aesthetics and the severing of aesthetic 
considerations from the consideration of truth.  As we all know, Gadamer 
develops this critique in the opening pages of Truth and Method.  The play 
of beautiful representations (again, Kant’s representationalism) provides us 
with disinterested aesthetic pleasure.  The basis for this pleasure is the fit 
between our cognitive faculties—intuition and conception.   The locus of the 
aesthetic is in the subject.  The aesthetic is distinct and not a matter of truth 
or morality. 
 So where does this leave us?  Kant would seem to be the very 
embodiment of the ‘bad’ Enlightenment.   Why and how does Gadamer 
write that with Kant, the ‘idol’ of the Enlightenment is over and with him 
(together with Rousseau) the interruption of the bad Enlightenment is over?  
How and why does Gadamer identify his hermeneutics with the 
Enlightenment? 
                                                        
20 TM 568; GW 2, 467. 
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III. Reclaiming Kant for Hermeneutics 
 One might be given to wonder whether this is somehow a matter of 
Gadamer’s development.  There are no positive remarks about the 
Enlightenment in Truth and Method.  The publications in the period just 
after the publication of this, his main work, are similarly uniformly 
negatively critical.  One sees his claim on the Enlightenment emerge in 
defense of his thought against the critics who see in his hermeneutics, 
irrationalism and romanticism.  But I do not believe it is a matter of 
development or change of thought on Gadamer’s part.  To shorten the 
argument, we need only go back to Gadamer’s Inaugural Address (1947) as 
he became Rektor of Leipzig University in the aftermath of the war.  Here he 
blames Germany’s embrace of Nazism, both broadly in the population and 
specifically in the universities, on the abandonment of the Enlightenment 
ideal of reason--life according to reason.21  
 The short answer as to why Gadamer reclaims Kant is Kant’s ethics.  
There are three closely related aspects of his ethics for which Gadamer 
wishes to reclaim Kant for his hermeneutics and for a philosophical ethics 
and politics.  These three things are  
                                                        
21 Gadamer, “On the Primordiality of Science: A Rectoral Address,” in Dieter Misgeld 
and Graeme Nicholson, ed., Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History, 
translation by Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss (Albany:  SUNY Press), pp. 15-
21. 
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1) freedom,  
2) human finitude, and  
3) the primacy of the practical.    
Kant importantly ends the ‘interruption’ of the bad Enlightenment by 
finding it necessary, as he writes in the B Preface, “to limit knowledge to 
make room for faith.”  This limitation of knowledge and science is both a 
proclamation of human finitude and an assertion of the primacy of the 
practical.   As is well known, Kant declares freedom, the realm of the 
practical, to be the keystone of his thought: “the concept of freedom … 
constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason, 
even of speculative reason….”22    
It is important that this rocky metaphor is that of a ‘keystone’ and not 
a ‘foundation’ stone or cornerstone.  Two important aspects of Kant’s 
thought related to this metaphor of the keystone are Kant’s clear rejection of 
mathematics as a model for philosophical thought and his declaration that, 
though philosophical thought must be systematic, philosophy is not to 
produce a system.  Descartes and Hobbes and their progeny saw the system 
of Euclidean geometry to be the model for philosophy. The goal is a single 
system of deductive inference that lays out all knowledge.  This goal 
                                                        
22 Kant, “Preface” to Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy, p. 139. 
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remained the goal of 20th century logical positivism.  In the Methodenlehre, 
the doctrine of method, at the conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason, --
an often overlooked part of this work—Kant breaks with this central aspect 
of early modern and Enlightenment thought.  
One might want to argue that the title of what is perhaps Kant’s most 
read book among his ethical writings works against any reading of Kant as 
avoiding foundationalism—sometimes translated as Foundations 
(Grundlegung) for a Metaphysics of Morals.   Is not Kant attempting here 
to provide a “ground” or “foundation” for a metaphysics of morals? This 
title notwithstanding, Gadamer would say no.  Gadamer reads Kant 
phenomenologically.  There have been endless debates about whether Kant’s 
argument succeeds in providing an adequate foundation for a metaphysics of 
morals.  The argument of the Foundations is circular.  The argument of the  
Critique of Practical Reason, that is, the transcendental deduction of the 
moral, appeals to freedom as a “fact of reason” [Faktum der Vernunft].  Kant 
in no way attempts to justify this fact.  Thus this phenomenological reading 
of Kant finds Kant presupposing freedom and not ‘proving’ it.  This reading 
finds Kant providing a description of moral experience as we experience the 
humiliating and sublime moral law in the person that we face.   Gadamer 
claims that Kant “clarifies” and does not “justify.”  He relies much on 
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Gerhard Krüger’s treatment of Kant’s ethics in his book Philosophie und 
Moral in der Kantischen Ethik.23  Krüger was a student friend and 
colleague of Gadamer in Marburg.  One can see Heidegger’s influence on 
Krüger’s reading of Kant.  Following Krüger Gadamer criticizes those 
readers of Kant who see Kant’s ethics as a “Sollensethik”—an ethic of 
principle from which one derives what one should do.24  Gadamer argues 
that Kant’s ethics is rather a critical ethic.  By which he means that the 
categorical imperative serves not so much as a principle of what one should 
do but rather a critical guide to what one should not do.  In response to 
Alisdair MacIntyre who might be seen as an ally in this context, Gadamer 
writes that MacIntyre and others “miss Kant’s wisdom.”25 
Kant’s wisdom, among other things, includes the rejection of the 
scientism of the ‘bad’ Enlightenment.  The ultimate arbiter of truth is not 
                                                        
23 Gerhard Krüger, Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Ethik (Tübingen:  Mohr 
Siebeck, 1967, 2nd edition).  This was Krüger’s habilitation of 1929 which he did 
under Heidegger’s direction.  In “Wertethik und praktische Philosophie” Gadamer 
writes that this book was of great help to him.  GW 4, 208. 
24 In conversation with Carsten Dutt, Gadamer comments that he opposes any 
“ethics of the ought,” that is, any “Sollensethik,”  “Gadamer in Conversation with 
Carsten Dutt,” Gadamer in Conversation, edited and translated by Richard Palmer 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2001), p. 82.  For the German, see Hans-Georg 
Gadamer im Gespräch, hrsg. Carsten Dutt (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Carl 
Winter, 1995), p. 70. 
25 “vernachlässigt … die Vorsicht und die Weisheit, mit der Kant das Problem einer 
philosophischen Ethik exponiert.”  Gadamer, “Ethos und Ethik,” GW 3, 357. 
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science.  Ordinary experience (as practical) and aesthetic experience are not 
reducible to the tenets of science.  
One way to see this distinction with its profound political implications 
is through Kant’s distinction between the hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives.  This Kantian distinction echoes, for Gadamer, the Aristotelian 
distinction of phronesis and techne—prudence or good judgment and 
technology.  Gadamer writes of Kant’s contribution in this regard that it  
remains true against every attempt to replace human moral action  
(Praxis) with technology (Technik) and against every attempt to 
confuse the rationality of our planning, the certainty of our calculation  
and the reliability of our prognoses with what we are able to know with 
unconditioned certainty.26   
 
This latter, that which Kant and Gadamer (following him) claim that we can 
know with “unconditioned certainty,” is our moral duty.  Accordingly, for 
Gadamer Kant’s great service is to preserve the distinctively moral against 
the merely useful.  Gadamer is obliquely referring to utilitarianism when he 
writes:  
 We owe Kant our unending thanks for disclosing the conse- 
 quential impurity of moral reasonings, that ‘disgusting mishmash’ 
 of moral and practical motives which the ‘practical worldly 
 wisdom’ of the Enlightenment validated as a higher form 
 of morality.27   
 
                                                        
26 Gadamer, “Kant und die hermeneutische Wendung,” GW 3, 221.  He makes a 
similar comment in the “Afterword” to Truth and Method, 570 (GW 2, 469) 
27 “On the Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics,” Gadamer Reader, edited by Richard 
Palmer (Evanston:  Northwestern University Press, 2007), 288; GW 4, 187. 
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He writes more straightforwardly elsewhere:  “The point is to overcome 
conceptually the utilitarianism of the Enlightenment and to restore once 
again the simple evidence of duty.”28  More than once Gadamer identifies 
the ethics of the Enlightenment, the ‘bad’ Enlightenment with utilitarianism.  
Inasmuch as this is so, Kant is not an Enlightenment thinker but an early 
counter-Enlightenment figure who follows Rousseau in this regard. 
 Closely connected with this criticism of the Enlightenment ethic of 
utilitarianism is what Gadamer sees as the great mistake of much of 
contemporary political thinking (both popular and ‘wissenschaftlich’), that 
is, the ‘replacement’ of praxis by techne.  This replacement is what the 
Frankfurt School refers to as the “instrumentalization of reason.”  It is also 
what Hannah Arendt points to as a basic and common fault of modern 
political thought.   The figure who came a generation (or two) before these 
leaders of German 20th century thought and provided the sociological and 
political groundwork for this insight (that goes back to Kant) is, of course, 
Max Weber.   It is not too much to say that German political philosophy of 
the 20th century—whether its Freiburg or Frankfurt--presents a kind of 
                                                        
28 “Ethos und Ethik,” GW 3, 357. 
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Weberian consensus with regard to a core critique of modern and 
contemporary politics.29  
 It is in this context that Gadamer reclaims Kant’s borrowed motto for 
the Enlightenment—to dare to think for oneself.  This call, Sapere aude!, 
Gadamer hopes, will awake us from what he calls our “technological 
dream”—the dream that we can solve all our problems with the right 
technology.30  
 Yet we might object that, though Kant may have preserved the 
distinction of phronesis and techne in his distinction of the hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives, he accomplished this at the cost of the concept of 
phronesis, prudence.  We might also object, that though there are reasons to 
accept a phenomenological reading of Kant’s ethical writings, Kant did not 
present them as such and he explicitly uses the language of principle and of 
‘laying a ground.’  
 A neater, cleaner, simpler Gadamer might have jettisoned Kant’s 
thought together with the entire Enlightenment for the reasons mentioned 
                                                        
29 In his reply to Detmer, Gadamer writes that “here the dialectic of enlightenment is 
right.”  In the same comment he speaks of the “bureaucratization of societal 
circumstances.” (287)  Gadamer late in life said he regretted not being able to carry 
out his intention to engage directly with Adorno after the publication of Truth and 
Method.  He was not able to, he says, because of the relatively early death of Adorno.  
See his conversation with Carsten Dutt, “Gadamer in Conversation with Carsten 
Dutt,” Gadamer in Conversation, p. 83.  For the German, see Hans-Georg Gadamer im 
Gespräch, p. 71 
30 “Science as an Instrument of Enlightenment,” In Praise of Theory, p.  83. 
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above and for an unambivalent embrace of classical Greek thought.  But in 
his comment on Ambrosio’s essay (mentioned above) Gadamer also says:  “I 
do not want to dispense with Kant and his concept of freedom.  …one 
cannot say this word in Greek.”31    
 I think that most would agree, speaking in a kind of shorthand, that 
the large major features and accomplishments of modernity (modernity as a 
function of the Enlightenment) are modern science and democracy.  
Gadamer would jettison neither.  He embraces both. But following Kant, he 
critically limits the claims of science.  And though democracy may have its 
origins in ancient Greece, the ethos of freedom that Gadamer would 
encourage goes beyond what we can find in Greece and Rome.  It has at its 
center Kantian the sense of duty and respect for the dignity of the person, 
though I think it important to note that Gadamer’s persistent call for 
solidarity goes beyond the Enlightenment individualism of Kant.   Gadamer 
remarks, for example, that Kant in all his writings devotes only one page to 
the phenomenon of friendship.32  
 Accordingly, Gadamer surprisingly (at least surprising to me) refers to 
the “continued viability of the Aristotelian-Kantian legacy.”33  These two 
                                                        
31 “Reply to Francis J. Ambrosio,” The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 274. 
32 “Freundschaft und Solidarität,” Hermeneutische Entwürfe, 56. 
33 GW 3, 366. 
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names do not join one another very readily, not even with a hyphen, though 
one might argue that Heidegger does something like this in Being and Time.  
Gadamer does not profess to contribute much to ethics.  He writes that the 
very “idea of a moral philosophy seems to be stuck in irresolvable 
difficulty.”34  He also writes that he sees no way from the later Heidegger to 
an ethics, but that the way to a moral philosophy remains open through Kant 
and Aristotle.  He writes:  “Neither can do justice to the possibility of ethics 
per se, but both can do so for their parts of it.”35    
 So the question that Gadamer leaves us with is how do we put 
together Aristotle and Kant to establish an ethics and a politics for this 
highly technological and globalized world.  A short answer to this question 
may be Hegel.  But it is interesting that in his writings explicitly about 
ethics, Gadamer, who in other contexts frequent refers to Hegel, almost 





                                                        
34 GW 4, 177. 
35 Gadamer Reader, 279; GW 4, 177. 
